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give traffic on a through highway the right of way7 and prevent just
what happened in this case-a car turning from a side road into a
highway immediately in front of a car thereon. The court says,
".. . the object of the statute is not to delay or impede travel. . ....
This is no doubt true. In fact, it is probable that the legislature was
seeking to speed up travel. But it is also probable that it had in mind
travel on the main highway.
If it be admitted that the purpose of the statute was to give traffic
on main highways the right of way, the instant situation then be-
comes similar to that in the New York case of Shirley v. Larkin Co.,s
in which X entered an intersection immediately in front of Y, who
had the right of way. The court there said that in disregard of the
statute, X "recklessly went on when it was his duty to wait for the
other car" and "precipitated the accident."
It is a familiar rule of bailments that when a carrier has de-
viated from his proper course, and goods in his possession have been
damaged, ". . . he cannot set up as an answer to the action the bare
possibility of a loss if his wrongful act had never been done."0 It is
interesting to speculate as to what would be the result if a rule anal-
ogous to this were applied in situations like the present one, and a
defendant were required to show that compliance with the statute
would not have prevented the result complained of instead of the
prosecution being required to show that compliance would have pre-
vented such result. 10
HuGH L. LOnDELL.
Damages-Measure of Recovery on Dissolution of
Injunction Restraining Foreclosure Sale
A recent North Carolina case raises the interesting question as to
the measure of damages that should be allowed to a defendant who
has been restrained from selling land under a power contained in a
deed of trust.'
'See Roe v. Kurtz, 203 Iowa 906, 210 N. W. 550 (1926).8239 N. Y. 94, 145 N. E. 751 (1924). A fact situation very similar to the
instant case is involvdd in Lasene v. Syvanen, 123 Ore. 629, 263 Pac. 59 (1928).
But cf. Teissier v. Stewart, 11 La. App. 164, 123 So. 174 (1929).
'Davis v. Garrett, 6 Bing. 716 (1830).
"In Conrad v. Springfield Con. Ry. Co., 240 Ill. 12, 88 N. E. 180 (1909)
it is said that one charged with a tort resulting from violation of an ordinance
may show in defense that compliance would not have prevented the injury
complained of.
'Gruber v. Ewbanks, 199 N. C. 335, 154 S. E. 318 (1930).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
In North Carolina, an undertaking is required as a condition prec-
edent to obtaining a restraining order or an injunction "to the effect
that the plaintiff will pay to the party enjoined such damages . . . as
he sustains by reason of the injunction, if the court finally decides
that the'plaintiff was not entitled to it."'2 Subject to certain limita-
tions to be set forth, the injunction defendant may recover all dam-
ages which are the natural and proximate results of the wrongful
issuance of the injunction. In the situation where a mortgagee is
restrained from selling land under the mortgage, one of the chief
elements of damage is loss of security. Any such loss may be re-
covered provided that the amount realized, or to be realized at the
sale, is inadequate to satisfy the mortgagee's interest-i. e., the debt,
interest thereon to the time of sale, and costs.3 The language used
by most courts in prescribing the measure of damages for loss of
security is loose and ambiguous. 4 It seems that any diminution in
value occurring between the time the sale would have taken place but
for the injunction and the time it actually has or, in the exercise of
due diligence after the dissolution, should have taken place is a result
of the injunction. Accordingly, recovery should be allowed for the
difference between the amount actually realized, or to be realized, at
the later sale and what would have been realized at the one enjoined.5
The postponement of the sale has delayed the mortgagee in the receipt
of money which he was entitled to. He should thus recover interest
on the money he would have received at the enjoined sale until the
time of the actual sale6 and interest on the difference between the
'N. C. ANN. CODE (Michie, 1927) §854; Davis v. Champion Fiber Co.,
175 N. C. 25, 94 S. E. 671 (1918) (Held damages might be recovered where
there was a partial dissolution of the injunction.).
'Fidelity and Deposit Co. of Md. v. Walker, 158 Ala. 129, 48 So. 600(1909) ; Schening v. Cofer, 97 Ala. 726, 12 So. 414 (1893) ; Foster v. Good-
rich, 127 Mass. 176 (1879); Edwards v. Bodine, 4 Edw. Ch. 292 (N. Y.
1843).
'Hill v. Thomas, 19 S. C. 230 (1882) (during delay of the sale) ; Belmont
Mining Co. v. Costigan, 21 Colo. 465, 42 Pac. 650 (1895) (from issuance to
dissolution) ; Gibson v. Reed, 54 Neb. 309, 75 N. W. 1085 (1895) (during the
time the injunction is in force) ; Meysenburg, Trustee for Sternberger v.
Schlieper, 48 Mo. 426 (1871) (during the time the sale is suspended).
This diminution in value may be caused by any of several things. Gib-
son v. Reed, supra note 4 (depreciation in value of the property) ; Osage Oil
Refining Co. v. Chandler, 287 Fed. 848 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1923) (decline in value
of stock) ; Aldrich v. Reynolds, 1 Barb. Ch. 613 (N. Y. 1846) (removal of
emblements) ; Moore v. Maryland Casualty Co., 280 Pac. 1008 (Cal. 1929);
De St. Aubin v. King, 209 Ill. App. 419 (1918); White v. Brooke, 11 Wash.
99, 39 Pac. 237 (1895) (sale of property under another mortgage).
'Hill v. Thomas, supra note 4; Johnson v. Moser, 72 Iowa 654, 34 N. W.
459 (1887); Holthaus v. Hart, 9 Mo. App. 1 (1880); Aldrich v. Reynolds,
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two amounts from the time of the actual sale until the time of judg-
ment on the injunction bond.7 When the mortgagee is entitled to
receive the rents and profits of the land as additional security and is
restrained from collecting these, the reasonable value thereof should
be allowed during the period of restraint.8
Other items of damage not dependent upon injury to the mort-
gagee's interest and unrestricted by the limitation that no more than
the debt, interest and costs may be recovered, are allowed. These
include the cost of the enjoined sale9 and the reasonable value of the
use of the land where the mortgagee can prove to a reasonably certain
degree that he would have purchased at the enjoined sale.' 0 North
Carolina refuses recovery for attorney's fees"' and expenses 12 in-
curred in obtaining a dissolution of the injunction. But these items
are permitted by a majority of the states.' 3
supra note 5; Pepper v. Dunlap, 19 La. 491 (1841) (no recovery for interest
on notes falling due after the injunction issues) ; Belmont Mining and Milling
Co., supra note 4 (error to allow interest on whole debt in the absence of a
showing that the property would have brought as much).
Aldrich v. Reynolds, supra note 5.
S Schening c. Cofer, supra note 3 (recoverable if debt is not satisfied by
the sale) ; Metz v. Brodfuehrer, 214 Ill. App. 458 (1919) (reasonable rental
value and not amount of rents actually received) ; Curry v. American Free-
hold Land Mortgage Co., 124 Ala. 614, 27 So. 454 (1900) (no recovery be-
cause a receiver could and should have been appointed to collect the rents).
'De St. Aubin v. King, supra note 5; Edwards v. Bodine, supra note 3;
Alliance Trust Co. v. Stewart, 115 Mo. 236, 21 S. W. 793 (1893).
10 Belmont Mining and Milling Co. v. Costigan, supra note 4 (court willing
to assume claimant would have bought in the absence of proof that others
would have, but not allowed because no evidence of the value of possession) ;
Holthaus v. Hart, supra note 6 (as purchaser at the foreclosure sale he might
have demanded the rent at once) ; Johnson v. Moser, supra note 6 (no recovery
because the sale did not take place and it is impossible to know who would
have bought); Bullard v. Harkness, 83 Iowa 373, 49 N. W. 855 (1891) (too
speculative).
'Midget v. Vann, 158 N. C. 128, 73 S. E. 801 (1912). The federal courts
and a respectable minority of the states also refuse recovery for this item.
Oelrichs v. Spain, 15 Wall. 211, 21 L. ed. 43 (1872) ; Note (1927) 55 A. L. R.
452. The leading North Carolina case, Hyman v. Devereaux, 65 N. C. 588(1871), permits recovery for counsel fees fixed by statute at that time, but
refuses to allow them if fixed by the parties.
'Midget v. Vann, supra note 11 (refusing recovery for expenses in at-
tending the hearing on the injunction); Gruber v. Ewbanks, supra note 1(refusing the expense of obtaining the presence of a non-resident witness).
Permitting recovery for counsel fees: Jesse French Piano and Organ Co.
v. Porter, 134 Ala. 302, 32 So. 678, 92 Am. ST. REP. 31 (1902); Burglass v.
Villere, 129 So. 209 (La. 1930) ; Oklahoma Cotton Growers Ass'n v. Hooven,
272 Pac. 852 (Okla. 1928); Aldrich v. Reynolds, supra note 5. Permitting
recovery for reasonable expenses: Waldauer v. Parks, 141 Miss. 617, 106 So.
881 (1926) (expenses in preparing for and attending trial); Alliance Trust
Co. v. Stewart, supra note 9 (cost of taking a deposition out of the state) ;
Bartram v. Ohio and B. S. Ry. Co., 141 Ky. 100, 132 S. W. 188 (1910) (re-
fusing value of time spent in attending trial but allowing traveling expenses).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
In all cases where malice or want of probable cause is absent, no
liability exists apart from the injunction bond and recovery is limited
to the penal sum thereof. 14 In North Carolina, the judgment dis-
solving the injunction carries with it a judgment for damages against
the parties procuring it and the sureties on the undertaking, to be
ascertained by reference or otherwise as the judge directs. 15 But
there can be no assessment of damages until the final determination
of the cause in which the injunction is obtained. 16 A motion for
damages must be made at or before the time the final judgment is
entered and no separate action can be maintained upon the bond. 17
This procedure raises difficult problems where a foreclosure sale is
restrained and the injunction continues until the final adjudication.
In such cases it will be necessary to assess damages before there can
be a sale. It must be shown that the debt, interest, and costs will not
-be realized on a sale and that the value of the security has been im-
paired. An actual sale is the easiest and most reliable way to estab-
lish this. The difficulty is obviated by permitting a separate action
on the bond after the sale has taken place.' 8
T. C. SMITH, JR.
Equity-Injunction to Prevent Garnishment of Wages-
Effect of Usury
In a recent Georgia case,' a wage earner sought an injunction
against the enforcement of a "sale of wages" given as a security for
a loan alleged to have been usurious, on the ground that the plaintiff
would lose his job if garnishment proceedings were brought. The
" 10th Ward Rd. District v. Texas and Pac. Ry. Co., 12 F. (2d) 245; 45
A. L. R. 1513 (C. C. A. 5th, 1926) ; Mark v. Hyatt, 135 N. Y. 306, 31 N. E.
1099; 18 L. R. A. 275 (1892); McAden v. Williams, 191 N. C. 105, 131 S. E.
375 (1926); Nausemond Timber Co. v. Rountree, 122 N. C. 51, 29 S. E. 61(1898).
" N. C. AN1. CODE (Michie, 1927) §855.
"'Raleigh and Western Ry. Co. v. Glendon and Gulf Mining and Manu-
facturing Co., 117 N. C. 191, 23 S. E. 181 (1895); Thompson v. McNair, 64
N. C. 448 (1870) (an injunction is an ancillary remedy and until the final
determination of the cause, it cannot be said as a matter of law that the order
was not rightfully obtained).
Crawford v. Pearson, 116 N. C. 718, 21 S. E. 561 (1895) ; Shute v. Shute,
180 N. C. 386, 104 S. E. 764 (1920). See McCall v. Webb, 135 N. C. 356, 365,
42 S. E. 802, 805 (1904).
"' Okla. Cotton Growers Ass'n v. Hooven, supra note 13; Belmont Mining
Co. v. Costigan, supra note 4; Gibson v. Reed, supra note 4. In the absence of
a statute permitting damages to be recovered in the same action, they cannot
be allowed. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Dey, 76 Iowa 278, 41 N. W. 17
(1888) ; American Bonding Co. v. State, 120 Md. 305, 87 Ati. 922 (1913).
'Lawrence v. Patterson, 153 S. E. 29 (Ga. 1930).
